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Abstract
Liberal economists have developed a framework of good governance as market-enhancing gover-
nance, focusing on governance capabilities that reduce transaction costs and enable markets to work 
more efficiently. In contrast, heterodox economists have stressed the role of growth-enhancing gover-
nance, which focuses on governance capacities to overcome entrenched market failures in allocating 
assets, acquiring productivity-enhancing technologies and maintaining political stability in contexts 
of rapid social transformation. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but current policy 
exclusively focuses on the former, and ignores the strong empirical and historical evidence support-
ing the latter to the detriment of the growth prospects of poor countries.
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Economists agree that governance is one of the critical factors explaining the divergence in performance 
across developing countries. The differences of view between economists regarding governance are to do first, 
with the types of state capacities that constitute the critical governance capacities necessary for the accelera-
tion of development and secondly, with the importance of governance relative to other factors at early stages 
of development.
On the first issue, there is an important empirical and theoretical controversy between liberal economists who 
constitute the mainstream consensus on good governance and statist and heterodox institutional economists 
who agree that governance is critical for economic development but argue that theory and evidence shows that 
the governance capacities required for successful development are substantially different from those identi-
fied by the good governance analysis. The economists in favour of good governance argue that the critical 
state capacities are those that maintain efficient markets and restrict the activities of states to the provision of 
necessary public goods to minimize rent seeking and government failure. The relative failure of many develop-
ing country states are explained by the attempts of their states to do too much, resulting in the unleashing of 
unproductive rent-seeking activities and the crowding out of productive market ones. The empirical support 
for this argument typically comes from cross-sectional data on governance in developing countries that shows 
that in general, countries with better governance defined in these terms performed better.
In contrast, heterodox institutional economists base their argument on case studies of rapid growth 
in the last fifty years. This evidence suggests that rapid growth was associated with governance capacities 
quite different from those identified in the good governance model. States that did best in terms of achieving 
convergence with advanced countries had the capacity to achieve and sustain high rates of investment and 
to implement policies that encouraged the acquisition and learning of new technologies rapidly. The institu-
tions and strategies that achieved these varied from country to country, depending on their initial conditions 
and political constraints, but all successful states had governance capacities that could achieve these func-
tions. This diversity in governance capacities in successful developers means that we cannot necessarily iden-
tify simple patterns in the governance capacities of successful states, but nevertheless, we can identify broad 
patterns in the functions that successful states performed, and this can provide useful insights for reform 
policy in the next tier of developers. The empirical and theoretical issues involved here clearly have critical 
policy implications for reform efforts in developing countries.
The second area of disagreement concerns the relative importance of governance reforms in accel-
erating development in countries at low levels of development. An important challenge to the mainstream 
good governance approach to reform in Africa has come from Sachs and others (2004) who argue that at the 
levels of development seen in Africa and given the development constraints faced by that continent, a focus 
on governance reforms is misguided. They support their argument with an empirical analysis that shows 
that the differences in performance between African countries is not explained by differences in their qual-
ity of governance (measured according to the criteria of good governance) once differences in their levels of 
development have been accounted for. The important policy conclusion that they derive is that in Africa the 
emphasis has to be on a big push based on aid-supported investment in infrastructure and disease control. 2  DESA Working Paper No. 54
While Sachs is right to emphasize the necessity of a big push in Africa (and their arguments in favour of such 
a strategy should hold true for other poorly performing countries in the developing world), the downgrad-
ing of governance capacities is probably misguided even for Africa. Our review of theory and evidence will 
address these two major questions and debates in the contemporary literature on the role of governance in 
explaining differences in performance in development since 1960, with particular emphasis on the period 
after 1980.
Market-Enhancing versus Growth-Enhancing Governance
To highlight the differences between the different economic approaches to governance, we will make a dis-
tinction between what we will call ‘market-enhancing’ and ‘growth-enhancing’ governance. The good gover-
nance argument that is frequently referred to in the governance literature and in policy discussions essentially 
identifies the importance of governance capacities that are necessary for ensuring the efficiency of markets. 
The assumption is that if states can ensure efficient markets, (in particular by enforcing property rights, a 
rule of law, reducing corruption and committing not to expropriate) private investors will drive economic 
development. This approach is one that implicitly stresses the priority of developing market-enhancing 
governance, and is currently the dominant paradigm supported by international development and financial 
agencies.
The importance of markets in fostering and enabling economic development is not in question. Economic 
development is likely to be more rapid if markets mediating resource allocation (in any country) become 
more efficient. The development debate has rather been about the extent to which markets can be made ef-
ficient in developing countries, and whether maximizing the efficiency of markets (and certainly maximizing 
their efficiency to the degree that is achievable in developing countries) is sufficient to maximize the pace of 
development. Heterodox approaches to governance have argued that markets are inherently inefficient in de-
veloping countries and even with the best political will, structural characteristics of the economy ensure that 
market efficiency will remain low till a substantial degree of development is achieved. Given the structural 
limitations of markets in developing countries, successful development requires critical governance capacities 
of states to accelerate accumulation (in both the private and public sectors) and ensure productivity growth 
(again in both sectors). In support of these arguments, they point to the evidence of the successful East Asian 
developers of the last five decades, where state governance capacities typically amounted to a lot more than 
the capacities necessary for ensuring conditions for efficient markets. In fact, in terms of the market-enhanc-
ing conditions prioritized by the good governance approach, East Asian states often performed rather poorly. 
Instead, they had effective institutions that could accelerate growth in conditions of technological backward-
ness and high transaction costs. This approach identifies the importance of a different set of governance capa-
bilities that can be described as growth-enhancing governance.
While a sharp distinction between these two approaches need not exist, it has been unfortunate for 
policy-making in poor countries that a somewhat artificial chasm emerged between these positions with the 
growing dominance of the liberal economic consensus of the 1980s. The new consensus was responding 
to the failure of many state-led industrialization policies in developing countries that had resulted in large 
non-performing industrial sectors in many of these countries by the 1970s. Instead of examining what was 
different about these cases compared to the successful developers, the new consensus argued that economic 
problems in these countries were mainly due to their attempt to correct market failures through state in-
terventions. It concluded that the costs of state failure were significantly greater than the costs of market Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s          3
failure and so government policy should only focus on making markets more efficient (Krueger, 1990). The 
contribution of the New Institutional Economics that emerged at about the same time was to point out 
that efficient markets in turn require elaborate governance structures. From this emerged an analysis of the 
governance requirements for development based on the underlying assumption that efficient markets were 
the most important contribution that states could make to the development process. The goal of governance 
should therefore be to enhance what we describe as market-enhancing conditions (North, 1990; Kauffman, 
Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999).
In contrast to this view, an alternative body of economic theory and considerable historical evidence 
supports a different view of the governance capabilities required for accelerating economic development 
in poor countries. This theory and evidence identifies the importance of governance capabilities that can 
directly accelerate growth in a context of structurally weak markets and very specific ‘catching-up problems’ 
faced by developing countries. Specific governance capacities are required for assisting the allocation of assets 
and resources to higher productivity and higher growth sectors using both market and non-market mecha-
nisms, and that can accelerate productivity growth by assisting the absorption and learning of new technolo-
gies. While the consensus development orthodoxy of the 1950s and 1960s recognized many of these func-
tions as important in the context of significant market failures in developing countries, it did not adequately 
recognize that the successful implementation of these strategies required a complementary set of governance 
capabilities. This is why the failure of these strategies in many countries and their dramatic success in a small 
number of East Asian countries could not be satisfactorily explained at the time. These governance capabili-
ties required for ensuring the effective implementation of growth-enhancing strategies are what we describe 
as growth-enhancing governance capabilities.
According to this view, the role of governance reform is to achieve these critical growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities. These governance capabilities are substantially different from those identified in the 
market-enhancing view. The two sets of governance capabilities are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but 
the distinction between them is important, particularly if an exclusive focus on market-enhancing gover-
nance diminishes the capacity of states to accelerate development. Box 1 summarizes the main characteristics 
of governance emphasized in each. The remainder of the section discusses these characteristics in greater 
detail. The section after that summarizes the empirical evidence.
In the market-enhancing view, the governance capabilities that are critical include the state’s capabil-
ity to maintain stable property rights, since contested or unclear property rights raise the transaction costs 
of buyers and sellers and prevent potential market transactions and investments taking place. For property 
rights to be stable, the state in particular has to constrain itself from expropriating the fruits of private invest-
ment, so another critical governance condition in this analysis is the credibility of government in assuring 
investors of low expropriation risk. Efficient markets also require governance capabilities to ensure efficient 
and low-cost contracting and dispute resolution. This requires in turn a good legal system. The same eco-
nomic theory tells us that markets require low corruption as corruption increases transaction costs as well 
as allowing the disruption of contracts and property rights. Corruption as a form of rent seeking can also 
result in the creation and maintenance of damaging rents. Finally, efficient markets require that the state will 
deliver public goods that the private sector cannot provide, and theory says that this requires an accountable 
and transparent government to convert a collective willingness to pay into efficient delivery of public goods 
and services. In theory, these governance capabilities should together ensure the efficiency of markets and 
from this stems much of the ‘good governance’ analysis of the role of governance in economic development. 
Efficient markets in turn will ensure the maximization of investments and the attraction of advanced tech-4  DESA Working Paper No. 54
nologies to the developing country, thereby maximizing growth and development. Thus, by enhancing the 
efficiency of markets, good governance drives economic development. The prediction of the theory is that 
differences in the quality of governance measured by these characteristics will correlate with performance in 
economic development. We will see that the evidence provides at best very weak support for this prediction.
There are at two related theoretical problems with this view of market-led development that are 
stressed in the growth-enhancing view. First, the historical evidence (some of it discussed below) shows that 
it is extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve these governance conditions in poor countries. In terms 
of economic theory, this observation is not surprising. Each of these goals, such as the reduction of corrup-
tion, the achievement of stable property rights and of an effective rule of law requires significant expenditures 
of public resources. Poor economies do not have the required fiscal resources and requiring them to achieve 
these goals before economic development takes off faces a serious problem of sequencing (Khan, 2005). It is 
not surprising that developing countries do not generally satisfy the market-enhancing governance criteria at 
early stages of development even in the high-growth cases. Thus, critically important resource re-allocations 
that are required at early stages of development are unlikely to happen through the market mechanism alone.
Not surprisingly, a significant part of the asset and resource re-allocations necessary for accelerating 
development in developing countries have taken place through semi-market or entirely non-market pro-
cesses. These processes have been very diverse. Examples include the English Enclosures from the sixteenth 
to the eighteenth centuries; the creation of the chaebol in South Korea in the 1960s using public resources; 
the creation of the Chinese “town village enterprises” (TVEs) using public resources in the 1980s and their 
privatization in the 1990s; and the allocation and appropriation of public land and resources for develop-
ment in Thailand. Successful developers have displayed a range of institutional and political capacities that 
enabled semi-market and non-market asset and property right re-allocations that were growth enhancing. 
In contrast, in less successful developers, the absence of necessary governance capabilities meant that non-
market transfers descended more frequently into predatory expropriation that impeded development.
Box 1. 
Market-Enhancing versus Growth-Enhancing Governance
Market-enhancing governance focuses on the role of governance in reducing transaction costs to make markets 
more efficient. The key governance goals are:
Achieving and Maintaining Stable Property Rights •	
Maintaining a Good Rule of Law and Effective Contract Enforcement •	
Minimizing Expropriation Risk •	
Minimizing Rent Seeking and Corruption •	
Achieving the Transparent and Accountable Provision of Public Goods in line with Democratically  •	
Expressed Preferences
Growth-enhancing governance focuses on the role of governance in enabling catching up by developing coun-
tries in a context of high-transaction cost developing country markets. In particular, it focuses on the effective-
ness of institutions for accelerating the transfer of assets and resources to more productive sectors, and acceler-
ating the absorption and learning of potentially high-productivity technologies. The key governance goals are:
Achieving Market and Non-Market Transfers of Assets and Resources to More Productive Sectors •	
Managing Incentives and Compulsions for achieving Rapid Technology Acquisition and Productiv- •	
ity Enhancement
Maintaining Political Stability in a context of rapid social transformation  •	Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s          5
Secondly, even reasonably efficient markets face significant market failures in the process of organiz-
ing learning to overcome low productivity in late developers (Khan, 2000b). Growth in developing countries 
requires catching up through the acquisition of new technologies and learning to use these new technologies 
rapidly. Relying only on efficient markets to attract capital and new technologies is inadequate given that 
efficient markets will attract capital and technology to countries where these technologies are already profit-
able because the requirement skills of workers and managers already exist. Developing countries have lower 
technological capabilities and therefore lower labour productivity in most sectors compared to advanced 
countries, but as against this, they also have lower wages. If markets are efficient, capital will flow to sectors 
and countries where the wage advantage outweighs the productivity disadvantage. However, for many mid 
to high-technology sectors in developing countries, the productivity gap remains larger than the wage gap. 
This explains why most developing countries specialize in low technology sectors and why this specializa-
tion would not change rapidly if markets became somewhat more efficient. However, if developing countries 
could accelerate learning, and therefore productivity growth in mid to high-technology sectors, this would 
amount to an acceleration of the pace of development.
Rapid catching up therefore typically requires some strategy of targeted technology acquisition that 
allows the follower country to catch up rapidly with leader countries. However, technology-acquisition strat-
egies have been remarkably diverse and high-growth countries have used very different variants of growth-
enhancing governance that allowed the acceleration of social productivity growth. Thus, not only are markets 
unlikely to become very efficient in developing countries, even relatively efficient markets would not neces-
sarily help overcome some of the critical problems constraining rapid catching up in developing countries.
To the extent that productivity growth depends on better resource allocation, improving market effi-
ciency is clearly desirable. But sustained productivity growth depends on the creation of new technologies or 
(in the case of developing countries), learning to use existing technologies effectively. Markets by themselves 
are not sufficient to ensure that productivity growth will be rapid unless appropriate incentives and compul-
sions exist to induce the creation of new technologies or the learning of old ones. While technical progress 
is possible along the trajectory set by a market-driven strategy, the climb up the technology ladder is likely 
to be slower through diffusion and spontaneous learning compared to an active technology acquisition and 
learning strategy.
But to achieve growth faster than that possible through spontaneous learning and technology diffu-
sion, states have to possess the appropriate governance capabilities both to create additional incentives (rents) 
for investments in advanced technologies that would not otherwise have taken place but also to ensure that 
non-performers in these sectors do not succeed in retaining the implicit rents. The creation and management 
of incentives by states in developing countries has been very diverse. In many developing countries, import-
substituting industrialization attempted to leapfrog technological levels by protecting domestic private or 
public sector enterprises. But the absence of credible commitments to withdraw support in case of failure 
and of adequate institutions to assist technology acquisition and learning meant that in most cases, the re-
sults were inefficient public and private sector firms that never grew up. Successful countries used many poli-
cies that appear superficially similar, including tariff protection (in virtually every case), direct subsidies (in 
particular in South Korea), subsidized and prioritized infrastructure for priority sectors (in China and Malay-
sia), and subsidizing the licensing of advanced foreign technologies (in Taiwan). But while the mechanisms 
used in many less successful developers appear similar to the ones on this list, there were significant differ-
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they typically failed to deal with the moral hazard of inefficiency that easily emerges with such strategies 
(Khan, 2000b).
The sharp distinction that has emerged in policy between market-enhancing and growth-enhancing 
governance is to some extent also due to the fact that growth-enhancing governance has some effects that 
appear to contradict the requirements of market-enhancing governance. For instance, growth-enhancing 
governance can increase the chances of corruption and other forms of rent seeking as it creates rents for the 
beneficiaries of these policies. In countries where the enforcement of growth strategies is effective and pro-
ductivity growth is high, the inevitable rent-seeking costs have to be set against the gains. But in countries 
where enforcement fails and productivity growth is low, the costs of rent seeking involved in any strategy of 
growth-enhancement appear to be the main problem. Indeed, in most developing countries where strategies 
of growth-enhancement was attempted, the results were poor, resulting in a growing consensus that such 
strategies had inbuilt adverse incentives that doomed them to failure. Box 2 summarizes the shift in consen-
sus opinion away from a position that was very sympathetic to the growth-enhancing goals of intervention to 
a new consensus that stresses only market-enhancement.
As Box 2 suggests, the abandonment of growth-enhancing strategies by the 1980s had a lot to do 
with the lack of attention given to the governance capabilities that states needed to have to implement these 
strategies effectively. The problem is that these governance capabilities can vary from country to country de-
pending on the type of growth-enhancing strategy attempted. When states intervene in markets to accelerate 
resource allocation in particular directions or assist technology acquisition, they create new incentives and 
Box 2. 
The Switch from Growth-Enhancement to Market-Enhancement
From roughly 1950 to 1980, the dominant view within development institutions was broadly sympathetic to a 
growth-enhancement approach to development. The consensus was that market failures were serious and state 
intervention was required to improve resource and asset allocation through non-market mechanisms. State 
intervention was also required to accelerate technology acquisition. This led to a broad degree of support for 
strategies of import-substituting industrialization, indicative planning and licensing the use and allocation of 
scarce resources like land and foreign exchange.
However, there was little attention given to the governance capabilities that states needed to have to implement 
these strategies and overcome the moral hazard problems of assisting some sectors and firms. Because of this, 
in most developing countries, the results of these strategies were poor. By the 1970s, a few developing countries 
had done spectacularly well but in most, the large protected sectors were performing poorly, many suffered from 
unsustainable fiscal deficits and debt, and the countries achieved low growth. A broad coalition of forces, includ-
ing civil society groups and NGOs, the World Bank and IMF, international economists and even some bureaucrats 
and politicians within these states began to criticize these strategies and demand reform.
At this juncture, growing support for market-enhancing policies and the market-enhancing approach to 
governance emerged. The emerging consensus explained the poor performance of these countries in terms of 
their states trying to do what was unachievable and ignoring what was essential. The new consensus eventually 
accepted that the successful East Asian states did not fit this model, but it argued that their success was due to 
pre-existing state capacities that did not exist elsewhere (World Bank, 1993). But instead of focusing governance 
reforms to attain at least some of these capacities, reform focused on achieving market-enhancing governance. 
The problem remains that while growth-enhancing governance capacities may be difficult to achieve, market-
enhancing capacities are not necessarily any easier to attain in poor countries. And even if markets became 
somewhat more efficient, it is not clear this would be sufficient to spur development in poor countries (see text).Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s          7
opportunities, and the market on its own is not likely to suffice as a disciplining mechanism for the resources 
now allocated through non-market or part-market mechanisms. As a result, the effective implementation of 
growth-enhancing strategies typically also requires effective growth-enhancing governance systems of com-
pulsion and discipline to supplement the discipline imposed by the market. But the precise nature of the 
governance capabilities required depends on the specific mechanisms through which the state attempts to 
accelerate technology acquisition and investment. The diversity of the experience of successful catching up 
in Asia tells us the importance of the compatibility of the governance capabilities that states have and growth-
enhancement strategies they are attempting to implement.
The learning strategy that is most likely to be effectively implemented in a country can depend 
amongst other things on the internal power structure that can determine if a particular strategy is likely to 
be effectively enforced. If a strategy requires disciplining powerful individuals or groups who can by-pass dis-
ciplining given the internal organization of power, effective implementation is very unlikely. Reform should 
then focus on developing a different strategy that requires incentives and compulsion for groups who might 
be easier to discipline, or an improvement in the governance capabilities of the state to monitor and disci-
pline the current beneficiaries. Doing neither and simply sticking with the existing strategy may deliver worse 
outcomes than depending on the market to allocate resources according to existing productive capabilities. 
This explains why abandoning growth-enhancement strategies in some developing countries can result for 
a time in better growth performance. The growth performance with liberalization is likely to be particularly 
strong (as in the Indian subcontinent), if growth-enhancing strategies had built up technological capaci-
ties that could not be profitably used given the failure of effective growth-enhancing governance, but which 
could be redeployed in a market regime to provide a spurt of growth.
The Empirical Evidence
The market-enhancing view of governance appears to explain the observation of poor performance in many 
developing countries attempting import-substituting industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s. Market-en-
hancing governance capabilities were poor in these countries, as was their long-term economic performance. 
However, the test that is required is to see if countries that scored higher in terms of market-enhancing 
governance characteristics actually did better in terms of convergence with advanced countries. When we 
conduct such a test we find that the evidence supporting the market-enhancing view of governance is weak. 
While poorly performing developing countries failed to meet the governance conditions identified in the 
market-enhancing view of governance, so did high-growth developing countries. This observation suggests 
that it is difficult for any developing country, regardless of its growth performance, to achieve the governance 
conditions required for efficient markets. This does not mean that market-enhancing conditions are irrel-
evant, but it does mean that we need to qualify some of the claims made for prioritizing market-enhancing 
governance reforms in developing countries.
Testing the relevance of the growth-enhancing view of governance is more complicated because 
we expect the relevant governance requirements will vary with the asset allocation and learning strategies 
followed by the country. Nevertheless, we suggest a typology of factors that can explain relative success and 
failure in a sample of countries that suggests that an alternative set of governance characteristics may have 
played a role in explaining differences in performance across countries. This approach can explain why there 
have been many different strategies of growth-enhancement in the successful countries of East Asia, each with 
different governance capabilities, and why some countries like India have apparently done better by aban-8  DESA Working Paper No. 54
doning strategies of growth-enhancement. There is some evidence of a similar experience in Latin America, 
with some countries achieving growth in new sectors following liberalization, sometimes using technological 
capabilities developed in the past.
Market-Enhancing Governance and Economic Growth
An extensive academic literature has tested the relationship between what we have described as market-
enhancing governance conditions and economic performance. This literature typically finds a positive 
relationship between the two, supporting the hypothesis that an improvement in market-enhancing gover-
nance conditions will promote growth and accelerate convergence with advanced countries. This literature 
uses a number of indices of market-enhancing governance. In particular, it uses data provided by Stephen 
Knack and the IRIS centre at Maryland University (IRIS 3, 2000), as well as more recent data provided by 
Kaufmann’s team and available on the World Bank’s website (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005). If 
market-enhancing governance were relevant for explaining economic growth, we would expect the quality of 
market-enhancing governance at the beginning of a period (of say ten years) to have an effect on the econom-
ic growth achieved during that period. However, the Knack-IRIS data set is only available for most countries 
from 1984 and the Kaufmann-World Bank data set only from 1996 onwards. We have to be careful to test 
the role of market-enhancing governance by using the governance index at the beginning of a period of eco-
nomic performance to see if differences in market-enhancing governance explain the subsequent difference in 
performance between countries. This is important, as a correlation between governance indicators at the end 
of a period and economic performance during that period could be picking up the reverse direction of causal-
ity, where rising per capita incomes result in an improvement in market-enhancing governance conditions.
There are good theoretical reasons to expect market-enhancing governance to improve as per capita 
incomes increase (as more resources become available in the budget for securing property rights, running 
democratic systems, policing human rights and so on). This reverses the direction of causality between growth 
and governance. Thus, for the Knack-IRIS data, the earliest decade of growth that we can examine would be 
1980–1990, and even here we have to be careful to remember that the governance data that we have is for 
a year almost halfway through the growth period. We do, however, have the Knack-IRIS indices for testing 
the significance of governance for economic growth during 1990–2003. The World Bank data on governance 
begins in 1996, and therefore these can at best be used for examining growth during 1990–2003, keeping in 
mind once again that these indices are for a year halfway through the period of growth being considered.
Stephen Knack’s IRIS team at the University of Maryland compile their indices using country risk 
assessments based on the responses of relevant constituencies and expert opinion (IRIS-3, 2000). These 
provide measures of market-enhancing governance quality for a wide set of countries from the early 1980s 
onwards. This data set provides indices for a number of key variables that measure the performance of states 
in providing market-enhancing governance. The five relevant indices in this data set are for ‘corruption in 
government’, ‘rule of law’, ‘bureaucratic quality’, ‘repudiation of government contracts’, and ‘expropriation 
risk’. These indices provide a measure of the degree to which governance is capable of reducing the relevant 
transaction costs that are considered necessary for efficient markets. The IRIS data set then aggregates these 
indices into a single ‘property rights index’ that ranges from 0 (the poorest conditions for market efficiency) 
to 50 (the best conditions). This index therefore measures a range of market-enhancing governance condi-
tions and is very useful (within the standard limitations of all subjective data sets) for testing the significance 
of market-enhancing governance conditions for economic development. Annual data for the index are avail-
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A second data set that has become very important for testing the role of market-enhancing gover-
nance comes from Kaufmann’s team (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005) and is available on the World 
Bank’s website (World Bank, 2005a). This data aggregates a large number of indices available in other data 
sources into six broad governance indicators. These are:
Voice and Accountability  1.  – measuring political, civil and human rights
Political Instability and Violence  2.  – measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, or changes in, 
government, including terrorism
Government Effectiveness  3.  – measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of 
public service delivery
Regulatory Burden  4.  – measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies
Rule of Law  5.  – measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence
Control of Corruption  6.  – measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, including both 
petty and grand corruption and state capture.
We have divided the countries for which data are available into three groups. ‘Advanced countries’ 
are high-income countries using the World Bank’s classification with the exception of two small oil econo-
mies (Kuwait and the UAE), which we classify as developing countries. This is because although they have 
high levels of per capita income from oil sales, they have achieved lower levels of industrial and agricultural 
development than other high-income countries. We also divide the group of developing countries into a 
group of ‘diverging developing countries’ whose per capita GDP growth is lower than the median growth 
rate of the advanced country group, and a group of ‘converging developing countries’ whose per capita GDP 
growth rate is higher than the median advanced country rate.
Table 1 summarizes the available data for the 1980s from the Knack-IRIS dataset. For the decade of 
the 1980s, the earliest property right index available in this dataset for most countries is for 1984. Table 2 
shows data from the same source for the 1990s. Tables 3 to 8 summarize the data for the 1990s using the six 
governance indices from the Kaufmann-World Bank data set. Figures 1 to 8 show the same data in graphical 
form. The tables and plots demonstrate that the role of market-enhancing governance conditions in explain-
ing differences in growth rates in developing countries is at best very weak.
First, there is virtually no difference between the median property rights index between converging 
and diverging developing countries (particularly given the relative coarseness of this index and that for most 
of our data the governance indicators are for a year halfway through the growth period). Secondly, the range 
of variation of this index for converging and diverging countries almost entirely overlaps. The absence of 
any clear separation between converging and diverging developing countries in terms of market-enhancing 
governance conditions casts doubt on the robustness of the econometric results of a large number of studies 
that find market-enhancing governance conditions have a significant effect on economic growth (Knack and 
Keefer, 1995, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Kauffman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999).10  DESA Working Paper No. 54
Table 1.  







Number of Countries  21 52 12
Median Property Rights Index, 1984 45.1 22.5 27.8
Observed range of Property Rights Index 25.1 – 49.6 9.4 – 39.2 16.4 – 37.0
Median Per Capita GDP Growth Rate, 1980-1990 2.2 -1.0 3.5
Sources: IRIS-3 (2000), World Bank (2005b).
The IRIS Property Rights Index can range from a low of 0 for the worst governance conditions to a high of 50 for the best 
conditions.
Table 2.  







Number of Countries  24 53 35
Median Property Rights Index, 1990 47.0 25.0 23.7
Observed range of Property Rights Index 32.3 – 50.0 10 – 38.3 9.5 – 40.0
Median Per Capita GDP Growth Rate, 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0
Sources: IRIS-3 (2000), World Bank (2005b).
The IRIS Property Rights Index can range from a low of 0 for the worst governance conditions to a high of 50 for the best 
conditions.
Table 3.  







Number of Countries  24 53 35
Median Voice and Accountability Index, 1996 1.5 -0.4 -0.3
Observed range of Property Rights Index 0.4 – 1.8 -1.5 – 1.1 -1.7 – 1.4
Median Per Capita GDP Growth Rate, 1980-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0
Sources: World Bank (2005a), World Bank (2005b).
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Table 4.  







Number of Countries  24 53 35
Median Political Instability  
and Violence Index, 1996 1.2 -0.4 0.0
Observed range of Instability  
and Violence Index -0.5 – 1.6 -2.8 – 1.1 -2.7 – 1.0
Median Per Capita GDP Growth Rate, 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0
Sources: World Bank (2005a), World Bank (2005b).
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s          11
Third, for all the indices of governance we have available, the data suggest a very weak positive 
relationship between the quality of governance and economic growth. The sign of the relationship is as the 
market-enhancing governance view requires but the weakness of the relationship demands a closer look at 
the underlying data. This demonstrates that the positive relationship depends, to a great extent, on a large 
Table 5.  







Number of Countries  24 53 35
Median Government Effectiveness Index, 1996 1.9 -0.5 -0.2
Observed range of Govt Effectiveness Index 0.6 – 2.5 -2.1 – 0.8 -2.2 – 1.8
Median Per Capita GDP Growth Rate, 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0
Sources: World Bank (2005a), World Bank (2005b).
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
Table 6.  







Number of Countries  24 53 35
Median Regulatory Quality Index, 1996 1.5 -0.1 0.2
Observed range of Regulatory Quality Index 0.8 – 2.3 -2.4 – 1.2 -2.9 – 2.1
Median Per Capita GDP Growth Rate, 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0
Sources: World Bank (2005a), World Bank (2005b).
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
Table 7.  







Number of Countries  24 53 35
Median Rule of Law Index, 1996 1.9 -0.4 -0.3
Observed range of Rule of Law Index 0.8 – 2.2 -1.8 – 1.1 -2.2 – 1.7
Median Per Capita GDP Growth Rate, 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0
Sources: World Bank (2005a), World Bank (2005b).
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Table 8.  







Number of Countries  24 53 35
Median Control of Corruption Index, 1996 1.8 -0.4 -0.3
Observed range of Control of Corruption Index 0.4 – 2.2 -2.0 – 0.8 -1.7 – 1.5
Median Per Capita GDP Growth Rate, 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0
Sources: World Bank (2005a), World Bank (2005b).
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 12  DESA Working Paper No. 54
Figure 1. 
Market-enhancing governance: Composite property rights index and growth, 1980-1990
Figure 2. 
Market-enhancing governance: Composite property rights index and growth, 1990-2003
Figure 3. 
Governance and growth using World Bank voice and accountability index, 1990-2003
Source: Using Knack-IRIS data.
Source: Using Knack-IRIS data.
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Figure 4. 
Governance and growth 1990-2003 using World Bank political instability and violence index
Figure 5. 
Governance and growth using World Bank government effectiveness index, 1990-2003
Figure 6. 
Governance and growth using World Bank regulatory quality index, 1990-2003
Source: World Bank/Kaufmann data.
Source: World Bank/Kaufmann data.
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number of advanced countries having high scores on market-enhancing governance (the countries shown 
as diamonds in Figures 1-8) and the bulk of developing countries being low-growth and low scoring on 
market-enhancing governance (the countries shown as triangles in Figures 1-8). However, if we only look 
at these countries, we are unable to say anything about the direction of causality as we have good theoreti-
cal reasons to expect market-enhancing governance to improve in countries with high per capita incomes. 
The critical countries for establishing the direction of causality are the converging developing countries (the 
countries shown as squares in Figures 1-8). By and large, these countries do not have significantly better 
market-enhancing governance scores than diverging developing countries. In the 1980s’ data set, there are 
relatively very few converging countries, and so the relationship between market-enhancing governance and 
growth appears to be relatively strong using the Knack-IRIS data set. However, in the 1990s data set, the 
number of converging countries in terms of our arithmetic definition is now greater and it is very significant 
that the strength of the relationship becomes much weaker both visually and using measures of goodness 
of fit despite the bias created by the governance indicators only being available from around 1994 for the 
Kaufmann-World Bank data set. This examination of the data therefore suggests to us that even the weak 
Figure 7. 
Governance and growth using World Bank rule of law index, 1990-2003
Figure 8. 
Governance and growth using World Bank control of corruption index, 1990-2003
Source: World Bank/Kaufmann data.
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positive relationship between market-enhancing governance and growth could be largely based on the reverse 
direction of causality, with richer countries having better scores in terms of market-enhancing governance.
Finally, the policy implications of these observations are rather important. Given the large degree of 
overlap in the market-enhancing governance scores achieved by converging and diverging developing coun-
tries, we need to significantly qualify the claim made in much of the governance literature that an improve-
ment in market-enhancing governance quality in diverging countries will lead to a significant improvement 
in their growth performance. Nevertheless, the significant differences in their growth rates suggest significant 
differences in the efficiency of resource allocation and use between these countries, and these differences are 
very likely to be related to significant differences in governance. The data suggests that since differences in 
market-enhancing governance capabilities are not significant between converging and diverging countries, 
we need to examine other dimensions of governance capabilities that could explain differences in growth 
performance.
Studies that find a significant positive relationship between market-enhancing governance and 
growth usually do so by pooling advanced and developing countries together. Our examination of the data 
suggests that these studies can be misleading because we expect advanced countries to have better market 
governance capabilities. Pooling can thus confuse cause and effect. When developing countries are looked 
at separately the relationship is much weaker if it exists at all, and even in this case, we need to be aware of 
sample selection problems if we pool relatively advanced and poor developing countries.
Our analysis is supported by the analysis of growth in African countries by Sachs and his collabora-
tors (Sachs and others, 2004). In their study of African countries, they address the problem that countries 
with higher per capita incomes are expected to have better market-enhancing governance quality and so 
their better governance indicators should not be used to explain their higher incomes. They do this by not 
using market-enhancing governance indicators directly as explanatory variables, but instead using the devia-
tion of the governance indicator (in this case the Kaufmann-World Bank index) from the predicted value 
of the indicator given the country’s per capita income at the beginning of the period. This approach is a 
more sophisticated way of dealing with the two-way causation between governance and growth. If market-
enhancing governance matters for growth, we would expect countries that had better governance than would 
be expected for their per capita incomes to do better in subsequent periods compared to countries that only 
achieved average or below average governance for their per capita incomes. By making this correction, the 
Sachs study finds that when adjusted in this way, market-enhancing governance has no effect on the growth 
performance of African countries. This result is entirely consistent with our observations of the global growth 
data recorded above.
However, we do not entirely agree with Sachs when they conclude that these results show that 
governance reforms are not an immediate priority for African countries. They argue that to trigger growth in 
Africa what is required instead is a big push in the form of a massive injection of investment in infrastruc-
ture and disease control. While the case for a big push in Africa is strong, this does not mean that African 
countries have the minimum necessary governance conditions to ensure that a viable economic and social 
transformation will be unleashed by such an investment push. This is because the evidence of big push exper-
iments in many countries has demonstrated that growth is only sustainable if resources are used to enhance 
productive capacity and new producers are able to achieve rapid productivity growth. These outcomes are 
not likely in the absence of institutional support and regulation from state structures possessing the appro-
priate governance capabilities given the reasons discussed earlier. The powerful econometric results reported 16  DESA Working Paper No. 54
by Sachs and others (2004) do not actually show that all types of governance are irrelevant for growth, only 
that the market-enhancing governance that is measured by available governance indicators clearly has less 
significance in explaining differences in performance between developing countries than is widely believed. 
Other forms of governance may be very important, but indices measuring these governance capacities are not 
readily available. In our next section we look at the evidence suggesting the importance of growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities.
Growth-Enhancing Governance and Economic Growth
The argument for market-enhancing governance that we have examined so far is that if efficient markets can 
be constructed, they will attract the most profitable technologies to a developing country. In contrast, the 
case for growth-enhancing governance argues that the most efficient markets that developing countries can 
construct will at best be relatively inefficient in transferring assets and resources to growth sectors. In addi-
tion, they are also likely to attract low technology and low value-added activities into the developing country, 
as these are the only activities that are currently profitable given the technological capabilities of the typical 
developing country. If technological capacity development can be accelerated, very high returns are likely in 
the future. But projects that aim to enhance technological capacity involve learning how to use new technol-
ogies and new methods of organizing work practices. This involves potentially long periods of losses with the 
promise of high profitability in the future, but only if there is very rapid and disciplined learning. For private 
investors in developing countries, the uncertainty involved in investing in this type of learning is typically 
too high to be worth the risk given that alternative investment opportunities are less risky and immediately 
profitable. Rapid catching up therefore requires complementary growth-enhancing interventions by states 
and the governance capabilities to ensure that they are effectively implemented (Aoki, Kim and Okuno-Fuji-
wara, 1997; Khan and Jomo, 2000).
The problem for growth-enhancing strategies is that while there is a credible theoretical case for 
intervention in late developers to assist them to move rapidly up the technology ladder, the effective imple-
mentation of such strategies typically also requires very effective governance capabilities to supplement the 
discipline imposed by the market. When states create incentives and opportunities to assist resource alloca-
tion or technology acquisition, the market on its own may well not suffice as a disciplining mechanism. Gov-
ernance capacities are now required to ensure that moral hazard problems do not subvert the growth-enhanc-
ing strategy. The precise governance requirements depend on the specific mechanisms through which the 
state attempts to accelerate technology acquisition and investment. The diversity of the policy mechanisms 
through which Asian countries accelerated catching up demonstrate that while there is clearly no single set of 
governance requirements to ensure that interventions for catching up are effective, the governance capabili-
ties have to be appropriate for ensuring that the growth-enhancing interventions are effectively implemented 
and enforced.
If the requisite governance capacities are missing, a growth-enhancing strategy may deliver worse 
outcomes than a market-led strategy, as poorly implemented interventions may worsen resource allocation 
as well as inducing high rent-seeking costs. But even a failed growth strategy can sometimes have unin-
tended consequences that are potentially useful if it develops human capital even though it fails to profitably 
employ these resources. If human resources are developed, these can often be exploited in new ways even 
if the growth strategy fails. The interactive relationship between growth strategies, governance capabilities 
and technological capabilities of producers can help to explain a) why many different strategies of indus-
trial catching up were successful in East Asia, b) why at the same time apparently similar growth-enhancing Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s          17
strategies have worked in some countries and failed dismally in others, c) why some countries like India have 
done reasonably well with liberalization by using some of the capacities developed by previous growth strate-
gies in new ways, and d) why some countries in Latin America have fared rather less well in terms of growth 
after liberalization when they allowed markets to significantly guide resource allocation to areas of current 
comparative advantage. In Latin America countries liberalization has often resulted in a shift towards lower 
technology manufacturing and commodity production.
While a full treatment of this diversity can only be done through a series of case studies, Table 9 
summarizes these experiences for a selection of countries showing the type of growth-enhancing strategies 
that they followed and the associated governance capabilities that either supported of obstructed the imple-
mentation of these strategies. During the 1960s, 1970s and part of the 1980s, most developing countries 
followed growth-enhancing strategies that had many common elements even though they often differed 
quite significantly in their detail. In all countries, two primary goals of developmental interventions were 
a) to accelerate resource allocation to growth sectors, and b) to accelerate technology acquisition in these 
sectors through a combination of incentives and compulsions. To achieve the first, a variety of policy mecha-
nisms were used including bureaucratic allocation of land (including land reform), the licensing of land use, 
the licensing of foreign exchange use, and the licensing or bureaucratic allocation of bank credit. In some 
cases, price controls and fiscal transfers were also used to accelerate the transfer of resources to particular sec-
tors. To achieve the second, incentives for technology acquisition included targeted tax breaks or subsidies, 
protection of particular sectors for domestic producers engaged in setting up infant industries, licensing of 
foreign technologies and subcontracting these to domestic producers, setting up investment zones for high 
technology industries and subsidizing infrastructure for them and so on. For both types of policies, growth-
enhancing governance required monitoring resource use and withdrawing resources or support from sectors 
or firms that proved to be making inadequate progress. Monitoring progress is less complex than it may 
appear, particularly in countries that are well inside the technology frontier as export performance or the rate 
of import substitution (in the presence of competition between domestic producers) can provide very good 
indirect information about the rate of productivity growth and quality improvement achieved by individual 
producers. The difficult part of growth-enhancing governance is to implement and enforce difficult decisions 
about resource withdrawal when performance is poor.
These and other available case-study evidence suggest that success in growth-enhancing governance 
depends on a number of institutional and political factors that enable the effective implementation of the 
underlying growth-enhancing strategies. The institutional requirements include the requirement that the 
agencies involved in monitoring and enforcement are sufficiently centralized to be able to internalize all the 
costs and benefits of implementing the strategy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Khan, 2000a). This is to ensure 
that failing industries or sectors are not able to offer inducements to monitoring agencies to allow them to 
continue to receive their rents without delivering performance. Just as important if not more is the political 
requirement that the governance agencies are able to enforce difficult decisions about rent and resource with-
drawal from non-performing sectors and firms when required. This in turn requires a compatibility of the 
required governance tasks with the internal power structures of the country. Table 9 also summarizes how the 
internal power structures of these countries played an important role in explaining why particular strategies 
of governance could or could not be effectively implemented.
Growth-enhancing governance is helped if political factions are too weak to protect non-performing 
industries and sectors. If political factions are strong and there are many of them, it becomes relatively easy 
for failing firms to buy themselves protection by offering to share a part of their rents with factions that offer 18  DESA Working Paper No. 54
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to protect them. The South Korean experience with industrial policy during the 1960s and 1970s demon-
strates how the absence of strong political factions can have very beneficial effects for a particular strategy of 
growth-enhancing governance. In contrast, the South Asian experience during the same decades (like that 
of many other parts of the developing world) shows how fragmented political factions can prevent effective 
growth-enhancing governance. But growth-enhancing governance can be moderately effective even in the 
presence of strong political factions, provided there is a political settlement that allows the political demands 
of factions to be satisfied through centralized transfers. This can reduce the incentive of factions to capture 
rents by protecting rent-recipients who are willing to pay. The Malaysian growth strategy of the 1980s and 
1990s provides some support for this hypothesis.
These possibilities can explain why successful countries appear to have very different growth-enhanc-
ing strategies when we look at the details of the instruments and mechanisms through which they set out to 
achieve rapid development. Strategies that can be effectively implemented in one context may be much more 
difficult to implement somewhere else. Different policy instruments may be more effective in other contexts 
if governance capabilities are more appropriate for enforcing these alternative strategies. This can explain why 
we can observe different combinations of policies and growth-enhancing governance capabilities delivering 
good, if not equally good results in different countries. So, for instance, a strategy of subsidizing credit for 
large conglomerates as in South Korea may have provided very poor results in a country like Malaysia where 
the enforcement capacities for such a strategy would have been much weaker. In contrast, the Malaysian 
strategy of creating incentives for multinational companies to bring in high technology industries and sub-
contract to local companies proved much more successful because this strategy was more consistent with Ma-
laysian governance capabilities. Thus, while Malaysian economic performance was a little poorer than that 
of South Korea, given Malaysia’s internal institutional and political structure and growth-enhancing gover-
nance capabilities, Malaysia’s growth was probably higher than if Malaysia had tried to follow South Korean 
economic strategies precisely. An analysis of the types of growth-enhancing strategies that can be effectively 
implemented in particular developing countries could therefore identify somewhat different growth strate-
gies in different countries, even though they address similar problems (of accelerating resource allocation to 
growth sectors and accelerating technology acquisition). The importance of such an analysis is not only to 
identify the growth strategies appropriate for the country given its growth-enhancing governance capabilities. 
In many countries, growth-enhancing governance capabilities may be so poor that no growth strategy can be 
implemented. In these cases, the policy response should not necessarily be to abandon growth strategies and 
shift to market-enhancing strategies. It should rather be to examine the type of growth-enhancing gover-
nance capabilities that can feasibly be achieved in that country through a process of governance reform.
As our analysis suggests that growth outcomes depend on the compatibility of a growth strategy 
with growth-enhancing governance capabilities, it is also possible to explain why many developing countries 
performed so poorly with growth strategies that appear similar to the ones followed by successful East Asian 
countries. A growth strategy that cannot be implemented could well provide worse results than if there were 
no growth strategy at all because any growth strategy overrides some allocations that would otherwise have 
happened through the existing market system, thereby creating rents and rent-seeking opportunities. If these 
rents fail to accelerate learning and instead result in large rent-seeking costs, the economy would be worse off 
trying to implement these strategies. However, this is clearly not necessarily a failure of the policy as such, 
but rather an indication of its inappropriateness in a particular country, or the failure of the country to ad-
dress the necessary governance requirements that would be required to accelerate growth and achieve more 
rapid development.20  DESA Working Paper No. 54
Another feature of the growth experience of the 1960s and 1970s was that many developing coun-
tries performed very well with growth-enhancing strategies that required minimal enforcement at the early 
stages when new resources were being made available to emerging infant industries. But their performance 
declined when the new industries demonstrated inadequate effort at learning and productivity growth and 
it turned out that states lacked the governance capacities to impose discipline or re-allocate resources. While 
the institutional and political feature that led to this result were different in different countries, the overall 
story is common to very many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America that began to perform very poorly 
in the latter half of the 1970s and beyond.
The liberalization that began in many developing countries in the late 1980s and 1990s in many 
developing countries has also produced very different results. This diversity of experience can also be ad-
dressed by an analytical approach that looks at the interdependence of growth strategies, growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities and technological capabilities. In countries where technological capabilities were 
already strong or were being continuously developed, partial liberalization produced strong results. At one 
end, China has emerged as the fastest growing economy in recorded economic history in a context of gradual 
and measured liberalization because previous growth-enhancing strategies had produced widespread techno-
logical capabilities within China to move into mid-technology manufacturing. Many aspects of the success-
ful growth-enhancing strategies of the past continue to be effectively implemented and appropriate growth-
enhancing governance capabilities exist to implement them effectively. These strategies include the strategies 
of local and central government in China to make land and infrastructure available on a priority basis to 
investors in critical sectors, and to offer fiscal incentives and attractive terms to both foreign and overseas 
Chinese investors engaging in investments critical for economic progress (Qian and Weingast, 1997). Thus, 
while compared to the earlier generation of East Asian developers, the Chinese state appears to be doing 
less in terms of actively supporting technology upgrading, it still has very strong governance capacities to 
ensure the allocation of land, resources and infrastructure to critical investors. With its vast internal market 
and the broad-based technological capabilities it has already achieved, Chinese manufacturing has been able 
to acquire scale economies that enable it to compete in price almost without challenge in the low- to mid-
technology manufacturing industries.
In contrast, the countries of the Indian subcontinent have had a different experience with liberaliza-
tion. Here, previous growth-enhancing strategies had succeeded in creating technological capabilities that 
were less broad based than in China. Political fragmentation was much greater and the governance capabili-
ties of states to direct resources to investors were significantly lower than in China. As in China, liberaliza-
tion proceeded at a very slow pace, opening up opportunities without precipitately destroying too much 
of existing capacity by exposing inefficient industries to excessive competition in the local market. Growth 
has been led by sectors that had already achieved the minimum technological capability for international 
competition taking the opportunity to start producing aggressively for domestic and international markets. 
The results were higher growth rates than in the past, led by a small number of sectors that had acquired 
enough technological capability to enjoy comparative advantage in international markets. These sectors dif-
fered across South Asia, ranging from the garment industry and shrimps in Bangladesh, low-end textiles in 
Pakistan to diamond polishing, call centres and software in India. The growth of internal demand has also 
sparked off investment in a range of industries that still have not acquired international competitiveness. 
While South Asia does not have the broad-based manufacturing growth we see in China, and has a much 
bigger and faster growing service sector, it too has been a beneficiary of very gradual liberalization of this 
type. However, while attempts at improving market-enhancing governance have not occupied too much time Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s          21
in China, the greater exposure of South Asian countries to the development discourse in multilateral agen-
cies has resulted in a much greater interest in and concern with improving performance in market-enhancing 
governance.
Our analysis suggests that while it is desirable over time to improve market-enhancing governance, 
the comparison of liberalization in China and India suggests that market-enhancing governance cannot ex-
plain their relative performance. Case studies of China and India do not suggest that China performs much 
better than India (if at all) along critical dimensions of market-enhancing governance such as the stability of 
property rights, corruption or the rule of law. Where it does do better is in having governance capacities for 
accelerating resource allocation to growth sectors, prioritizing infrastructure for these sectors, and in making 
credible and attractive terms available to investors bringing in advanced technologies, capabilities that we 
have described as growth-enhancing governance capabilities.
Latin America provides even more compelling evidence that a focus on market-enhancing gover-
nance alone cannot provide adequate policy levers for governments interested in accelerating growth and 
development. Compared to China and the Indian subcontinent, liberalization in Latin America has been 
more thoroughgoing and has extended in many cases to the liberalization of the capital account and much 
freer entry conditions for imports into the domestic market. In terms of market-enhancing governance, 
Latin America on average scores highly compared to other areas of the developing world. This is not sur-
prising given its higher initial per capita incomes, much longer history of development, and relatively old 
institutions of political democracy (even though in many cases these institutions were for a while subverted 
by military governments). Yet the combination of more developed market-enhancing governance capabilities 
and a more thoroughgoing liberalization did not help Latin America beat Asia in terms of economic develop-
ment in the 1990s and beyond. In fact, its relative performance was exactly the opposite of what we would 
expect from the relative depth of its liberalization strategy and its relative governance indicators. But in fact, 
the rapid liberalization of Latin America and its greater reliance on market-enhancing governance achieved 
results that should not be entirely surprising given our analysis. Latin American countries shifted even more 
rapidly to producing according to their comparative advantage, and in most Latin American countries this 
meant a shift to lower technology industries and to commodity production. This has produced respectable 
output growth in some countries, but productivity growth has been low and living standards have yet to fully 
recover from the collapse suffered in the 1990s.
The distinction between market-enhancing and growth-enhancing governance can thus allow us to 
make sense of the complex comparative economic performance of countries since 1960. It also allows us to 
reassert the importance of governance even though the types of governance that many institutional econo-
mists have focused on do not correlate very well with comparative economic performance. From a policy 
perspective our analysis points out the limitations of the current governance agenda that focuses almost 
exclusively on market-enhancing governance. The danger of such an exclusive focus on market-enhancing 
governance is that we may lose opportunities for carrying out critical reforms that are more likely to produce 
results. We may also create disillusionment with governance reforms and the emergence of the false percep-
tion that governance does not matter that much for economic development.22  DESA Working Paper No. 54
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